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General Instructions for Participants 
 
 
 
You are taking part in an economic experiment. Please read the following instructions carefully. You 
can earn money in this experiment. Your earnings depend on both your decisions and on the 
decisions of the other participants. At the end of the experiment, the total amount of money earned 
will be paid to you in cash. Additionally, you will receive a show-up fee of 2 Euro.  
Throughout the experiment, monetary amounts are not quoted in Euro, but points. Your total 
earnings will thus be initially calculated in points. In the end the total amount of money earned 
during the experiment will be converted into Euro, where: 
 
1 Point = 0.05 Euro 
 
The experiment consists of two parts. You can earn money in both parts. So far you have received 
only the instructions of part 1. Instructions for part 2 will be handed out when part 1 is completed.  
 
In this experiment there are two types of participants, A-participants and B-participants, who make 
different decisions. You will only get to know your own type shortly before the start of the 
experiment. The types will be randomly assigned. Please read the instructions about the decisions of 
the two types carefully. 
 
All participants receive the same instructions. Hence, all participants receive the same information. 
Talking is not permitted throughout the entire experiment. Failure to comply will result in 
exclusion from the experiment and the loss of all earnings. If you have any questions, please 
address them to us: raise your hand and an experimenter will come to you. 
 
On the following pages, the further course of the experiment is described in detail. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Information about the Procedure of Part 1 of the Experiment 
 
 
The experiment consists of 20 periods. At the beginning of the experiment all participants will be 
randomly divided into groups of 4 participants, each group consisting of three A-participants and 
one B-participant. This group composition remains unchanged throughout the 20 periods. That is, 
you interact with the same three participants through all 20 periods. 
 
At the end of the experiment, 1 of the 20 rounds will be randomly selected. The total amount of 
points earned in this period determines your payoff from part 1 of the experiment. You will not 
receive any information about your payoff before the end of part 2 of the experiment. 
  
In every period, each of the three A-participants and the B-participant receive an endowment of 70 
points and 153 points, respectively.  
 
Each of the A-participants has to decide on how to allocate their endowment. There are two options: 
 
 You choose the private account: Your endowment of 70 points will be allocated to the 
private account. 
 You choose the group account: Your endowment of 70 points will be allocated to the group 
account.   
 
The income of an A-participant is calculated differently according to the chosen account: 
 
The point income from the private account directly corresponds to the amount of points allocated 
to it. If you allocate your endowment to the private account your income from the private account 
amounts to 70 points. If you allocate your endowment to the group account, your income from the 
private account amounts to 0 points. Nobody but yourself derives income from your private 
account. 
 
Your point income from the group account does not solely depend on your decision, but also on 
the decisions of the other A-participants in your group. The point income from the group account 
corresponds to the sum of contributions to the group account by all three A-participants, multiplied 
by the factor 0.6. As soon as one of the A-participants (either you or a member of your group) 
chooses the group account, the group account increases by 70 points. Accordingly, the point income 
that every A-participant of the group receives increases by 70 x 0.6 = 42 points. The total point 
income of the group thereby increases by 3 x 42 = 126 points. Every A-participant of a group 
receives the same income from the group account, regardless of whether she contributed to the 
group account or not. 
 
Depending on how the three A-participants decide to allocate their points, 4 different cases can 
occur: Table 1 illustrates the total group income depending on the number of A-participants who 
chose the group account (group-account-contributors), the number of A-participants who choose the 
private account (private-account-contributors) and whether an A-participant is a private- or a group-
account-contributor herself, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Decisions and Total Point Income of A-Participants  
 
Case Decisions of the A-Participants Point Income of a 
Private-Account-
Contributor 
Point Income of a 
Group-Account-
Contributor
1 3 A-participants choose the private account and 0 A-participants choose the group account   70 -
2 2 A-participants choose the private account and 1 A-participant chooses the group account  112 42
3 1 A-participant chooses the private account and 2 A-participants choose the group account  154 84
4 0 A-participants choose the private account and 3 A-participants choose the group account - 126
 
As an example, we will explain case 2 of Table 1 in more detail below. 
 
Cass 2: Two of the three A-participants choose the private account and one chooses the group 
account. Hence, 1 x 70 = 70 points are in total allocated to the group account. Every A-participant 
receives 70 x 0,6 = 42 points from the group account. The two private-account contributors 
additionally receive 70 points from their private account and thus receive a total of 42 + 70 = 112 
points each. 
 
After every period, the A-participants receive information about their point income from both the 
group and the private account. 
 
While the A-participants are making their decisions, the B-participants are asked to complete a 
questionnaire. The corresponding instructions will be presented on the computer screen. The total 
point income of a B-participant equals the endowment of 153 points in every round. 
 
The total point income of an A-participant is calculated as follows:  
 
    Point income from the private account 
+  Point income from the group account 
=  Total Point Income 
 
The total point income of a B-participant is calculated as follows:  
 
  Point endowment             
=  Total point income 
 
Recall: Only one of the 20 periods will be randomly selected. The total point income in this period 
determines your payoff from part 1 of the experiment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Information about the Procedure of Part 2 of the Experiment 
 
 
In this part, you are assigned to the same type (A-participant or B-participant) as in the first part of 
the experiment. The experiment consists of 20 periods. Once again, you will be randomly divided 
into groups of 4 participants. Each group consists of 3 A-participants and 1 B-participant. Your 
fellow group members will not be the same as in the first part of the experiment. Instead, a new 
group with 3 different fellow group members is formed. This grouping remains unchanged 
throughout the 20 periods. That is, you interact with the same three participants for all of the 20 
periods. 
 
As in part 1, 1 of the 20 rounds will be randomly selected at the end of the experiment. The total 
amount of points earned in this period determines your payoff from part 2 of the experiment. 
  
In every period, each of the three A-participants and the B-participant receive an endowment of 70 
points and 153 points, respectively.  
 
As in part 1, every A-participant has to decide on how to allocate her endowment. Before heading to 
these decisions a vote will take place. The three A-participants vote with which of two versions of 
the experiment they wish the experiment to proceed (version 1 or version 2). 
 
Version 1 - Experiment without the option to assign deduction points 
 
In this version, the instructions remain the same as in part 1 of the experiment. The A-participants 
decide how to allocate their endowment. The B-participants complete a questionnaire.   
 
 
Version 2 - Experiment with the option to assign deduction points 
 
For all A-participants, the decision on how to allocate their endowment in version 2 is exactly the 
same as in version 1. 
 
Additionally, the B-participant can reduce the income of the A-participants who choose the private 
account by assigning deduction points. The B-participant can also leave the income of private-
account-contributors unchanged by refraining from assigning deduction points. The B-participant 
cannot, however, assign deduction points to group-account-contributors. 
 
Every deduction point that a B-participant assigns to a private-account-contributor has a deduction 
value of 3 points. That is, assigning 1 deduction point reduces the private-account-
income by 3 points. 
 
Table 2: Deduction points and deduction values 
 
Deduction 
points 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Deduction 
value 0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 
 
Table 2 shows an overview of the resulting deduction values for all possible quantities of deduction 
points (0-9). If, for instance, the B-participant assigns 3 deduction points to a private-account-
contributor, this leads to a deduction value of 9 points. That is, the income of the private-account-
contributor is reduced by 9 points in this round. Accordingly, if the B-participant assigns 0 
deduction points to a private-account-contributor, this leads to a deduction value of 0 points. That is, 
the income of the private-account-contributor remains unchanged. 
   
To each of the private-account-contributors, a maximum of 9 deduction points can be assigned. 9 
deduction points lead to a deduction value of 27 points. It is not possible to assign different numbers 
of deduction points to particular private-account-contributors. A B-participant can assign a 
maximum of 27 deduction points (= 3 private contributors * 9 deduction points).  
 
The sum of assigned deduction points to the private-account-contributors will then be deducted 
from the B-  
 
Hence, deduction points indicate by how many points the income of a B-participant is reduced. 
Deduction values indicate by how many points the income of an A-participant is reduced. 
  
When the B-participant decides on the deduction points for the private-account-contributors, the 
actual decisions of the A-participants are yet unknown. Thus, decisions on the deduction points are 
made for the 3 possible cases when there is at least 1 private-account-contributor, i.e. independent 
of the yet-unknown number of private-account-contributors. The B-participant enters the deduction 
points for each of the three cases in table 3, which will then be presented on the computer screen. In 
the fourth possible case, no deduction points can be assigned, since in this case all A-participants 
are group-account-contributors. 
 
Table 3: Decisions of the B-Participants 
 
Case Decision of the A-Participants Deduction Points Per Private-Account-
Contributor (0  9) 
1 3 A-participants choose the private account and 0 A-participants choose the group account  
 
 
2 2 A-participants choose the private account and 1 A-participant chooses the group account   
3 1 A-participant chooses the private account and 2 A-participants choose the group account  
 
 
4 0 A-choose the private account 3A-participants choose the group account ---- 
 
As an example, we will explain case 3 of Table 3 in more detail below. 
 
Case 3: One A-participant chooses the private account and two A-participants choose the group 
account. The private-account-contributor earns 154 points and the group-account-contributors 
each earn 84 points (see Table 1). If, for instance, the B-participant assigns 7 deduction points to 
the private-account-contributor, the B-  endowment of 153 points is reduced by the 
arising cost of 7 points (153-7=146). The private-account-
deduction value of 3*7=21 points to 154-21=133 points. The income of both the group-account-
contributors remains unchanged (84 points). 
 
The B-  decisions on the deduction points for the 3 relevant cases apply to all of the 20 
periods. In each period, the deduction points determined by the B-participant apply according to the 
actual number of private-account-contributors. After the first period, the A-participants receive 
information about the decision on the assignment of deduction points to the private-account-
contributors, which -participant made for each of the 3 cases. 
 
After the deduction point decision, the B-participant is asked to complete a questionnaire, to be 
presented on the computer screen. At the end of the 20 periods, the B-participant receives 
information about the A- sum of deduction points assigned to the 
three A-participants, and their own point income in each of the periods.  
 
The point income of an A-participant is calculated as follows:  
 
    Point income from the private account 
+  Point income from the group account 
-  Deduction value (= assigned deduction points*3)  
=  Total point income 
 
The point income of a B-participant is calculated as follows:  
 
    Point endowment  
-  Sum of assigned deduction points to private-account-contributors 
=  Total point income 
 
Recall: Only one of the 20 periods will be randomly selected. The total point income in this period 
determines your payoff from part 2 of the experiment. 
 
The Vote between Version and Version 2 
 
Before the A-participants make a decision on the allocation of points, a vote takes place. The three 
A-participants vote on whether they wish to proceed with version 1 (without the option to assign 
deduction points) or with version 2 (with the option to assign deduction points) of the experiment. 
 
After the A-participants have cast their vote, the computer randomly determines whether the vote 
will be considered. 
 
 If the computer determines the vote to be considered, the majority determines whether 
version 1 or version 2 of the experiment applies. The assignment of deduction points to 
private-account-contributors is possible if the majority of the A-participants of one group 
(i.e. 2 or 3 A-participants) votes for this option. If only a minority (0 or 1 A-participants) 
votes for this option, the assignment of deduction points is not possible. 
 
 If the computer determines the vote not to be considered, a random mechanism 
determines whether version 1 or version 2 of the experiment applies. 
 
After the vote, all the group members (the three A-participants and the B-participant) will receive 
information about the vote result and whether it will be considered. Subsequently, all participants 
learn whether the option to assign deduction points to private-account-contributors will exist in the 
following 20 periods or not. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary  
 
You will be divided into new groups of 4 (3 A-participants and 1 B-participants). Your fellow group 
members are participants with whom you have not interacted in part 1. Both  group composition 
and your type remain unchanged for 20 periods. 
 
A-Participants 
You decide on whether you wish to proceed with version 1 or version 2 of the experiment. 
The computer randomly determines whether the vote will be considered. 
 
The vote will be considered. The vote will not be considered. 
 
 
 
 
The majority determines whether version 1 or 
version 2 applies. 
A random mechanism determines whether 
version 1 or version 2 applies. 
In both versions, you decide whether you allocate your point endowment to the private account or 
to the group account in each of the 20 periods. After every period, you receive information about 
your point income from both the private account and the group account. If deduction points can be 
assigned to private-account-contributors, and if you have allocated your point endowment to the 
private account in the respective period, you will further receive information about whether a B-
participant assigned deduction points to you and, if yes, how many. 
 
B-Participants 
You receive information about the vote result in your group. You learn whether the vote result will 
be considered (in which case the majority determines whether version 1 or version 2 applies) or 
whether it will not be considered (in which case a random mechanism determines whether version 1 
or version 2 applies). 
 If version 2 applies, you decide on the assignment of deduction points to private-account-
contributors prior to the beginning of the 20 periods. The decision on the deduction points 
applies according to the actual number of private-account-contributors in each of the 20 
periods. Afterwards, you are asked to complete a questionnaire. 
 If version 1 applies, you are asked to complete a questionnaire. 
 
In both versions, after the A-participants have made their decisions in the 20 periods, you receive 
information about the A-participants , the sum of the assigned deduction points to 
the private-account-contributors and about your own total point income in each of the periods. 
 
At the end of the experiment, you will receive all payoff-relevant information from part 1 and 
2 of the experiment. We kindly ask you to remain seated until you are called. 





















